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Antisuit Injunction and Notice of Intervention 
and Preclusion: Complementary Devices to 
Prevent Duplicative Litigation 
Edward F. Sherman* 
How to overcome the expense, delay, and possible 
inconsistency of mass duplicative litigation is one of the most 
pressing issues in civil procedure today. Mass duplicative 
litigation arises when a large number of related cases are 
based on the same transaction, conduct, condition, or product 
and are pursued separately.' The primary mechanisms for 
reducing mass duplicative litigation are the procedural devices 
used to aggregate similar cases-j~inder,~ consolidation,3 and 
class action. These aggregative devices, however, are not 
themselves capable of preventing all duplicative litigation that 
can interfere with the disposition of the aggregated case. A 
court may need, for example, to enjoin the parties, or 
nonparties with similar claims, from prosecuting their cases in 
other courts if those suits would undermine the resolution of 
the aggregated case. A court may also desire to ensure that 
nonparties with similar claims who have been given an 
* Edward Clark Centennial Professor of Law, University of Texas School of 
Law. A.B., 1959, Georgetown University; LL.B., 1962, S.J.D., 1981, Harvard Law 
School. By way of disclosure, the author was on the Members Advisory Group of 
the ALI Complex Litigation Project and testified as an expert witness on the 
fairness of the global settlement to the third-party defendant class in Ahearn v. 
Fibreboard Corp., 162 F.R.D. 505 (E.D. Tex. 1995), infra notes 114-17, 150-53. 
1. Examples would include mass accidents (e.g., plane crashes), harm to the 
environment (the escape of toxic substances), injury from defective products (the 
unanticipated effects of taking prescription drugs or using products), and damage 
caused by the same wrongful conduct (stock investors subjected to security fraud or 
consumers to illegal financial practices). 
2. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19 (mandatory joinder); FED. R. CIV. P. 20 
(permissive joinder). 
3. See FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a) ("When actions involving a common question of 
law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of 
any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions 
consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may 
tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay."). 
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opportunity to join the aggregated case cannot later challenge 
the judgment, thus preventing future duplicative litigation. 
These results may be accomplished through two complemen- 
tary procedural devices-the antisuit injunction and notice of 
intervention and preclusion. Both devices are incorporated into 
the aggregative scheme proposed by the American Law 
Institute's Complex Litigation P r o j e ~ t . ~  
The ALI Proposal relies on the aggregative scheme of 
consolidation, supplemented by expanded opportunities for 
using "rerno~al"~ and "tran~fer"~ to bring similar cases into 
the jurisdiction of a single court where consolidation can occur. 
The Proposal also sets out specific procedures for invoking the 
two complementary devices-the antisuit injunction and 
preclusion-in recognition of their importance for enhancing 
the effects of aggregation. These are not new devices, although 
the manner in which the Proposal would use them contains 
some innovative features. They are proposed as an integral 
part of the ALI consolidation scheme, but they also have 
significant applications to other kinds of aggregative 
mechanisms not adopted by the Proposal. This article will 
examine the application of these devices both as contemplated 
by the Proposal in its consolidation scheme and in their current 
use in the context of class actions. 
The purpose of an antisuit injunction is to prevent 
interference with the litigation pending before a court. The 
injunction forbids the parties, and possibly other persons over 
whom the court has jurisdiction, from litigating outside that 
court any claims arising out of the same matters as the suit 
before it. The propriety of one court's issuing an injunction to 
4. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMEN- 
DATIONS AND ANALYSIS (1994) [hereinafter COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL]. 
5. Federal-state intersystem consolidation of cases pending in both federal 
and state courts would be enhanced by expanding the existing provisions for 
removal of state cases to federal court. 28 U.S.C. $5 1441-1452 (1988). Through a 
grant of supplemental jurisdiction, state actions arising from the same transaction 
as  a pending federal action could be removed to federal court where they could 
then be consolidated. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 4, $8 5.01-.03. 
6. Federal intrasystem consolidation of cases pending in different federal 
courts would be enhanced by expanding the scope of the existing "multidistrict 
litigation" transfer provision, 28 U.S.C. $ 1407(a) (19881, to include transfer for 
trial as well as pretrial disposition. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 4, 
$9 3.01-.08. 
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prevent duplicative litigation in another court has long been 
recognized in appropriate cases.7 Injunctions are directed 
against the parties who are before the court, rather than 
against other ~ o u r t s . ~  The threat of sanctions under the 
contempt power serves to enforce the injun~tion.~ 
Both federal and state courts may issue antisuit 
injunctions. Like other injunctions, an antisuit injunction must 
satisfy the equitable requirements of irreparable injury and 
lack of an adequate remedy at law.'' The general rule, 
although susceptible of various exceptions, "is that as a 
principle of sound judicial administration, 'the first suit should 
have priority, absent the showing of balance of convenience in 
favor of the second action.'"" When a federal court enjoins 
prosecution of a suit in another federal court, principles of 
comity require that courts of coordinate jurisdiction exercise 
"forbearance" by "avoiding interference with the process of each 
other."12 Injunctions by federal courts against prosecution of 
suits in state courts face the additional constraints of the Anti- 
Injunction Act, which forbids injunctions against state 
prosecutions subject to three narrow exceptions.13 Injunctions 
by state courts against the prosecution of suits in other state 
7. See Applestein v. United Board & Carton Corp., 173 A.2d 225, 228 (N.J. 
1961) (stating that to "render complete and final justice, . . . and to protect parties 
from the vexation and oppression of litigating the same controversy in different 
states," "a court of equity has the power to restrain a party over which it  has 
personal jurisdiction from prosecuting judicial proceedings in another state" 
(citations omitted)); see also Gannon v. Payne, 706 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tex. 1986) 
("[Sltate courts do have the power to restrain persons from proceeding with suits 
filed in other courts of [the] state."). 
8. See State ex rel. General Dynamics Corp. v. Luten, 566 S.W.2d 452, 458 
(Mo. 1978). But see Honorable Scott 0. Wright & Joseph A. Colussi, The Successful 
Use of the Class Action Device in the Management of the Skywalks Mass Tort 
Litigation, 52 UMKC L. REV. 141, 148 n.28 (1984) (questioning whether courts can 
enjoin other courts from proceeding). 
9. See 11A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PF~OCEDURE 
5 2960 (2d ed. 1995). 
10. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971). Cf. DOUGLAS 
LAYCOCK, DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE (1992). 
11. William Gluckin & Co. v. International Playtex Corp., 407 F.2d 177, 178 
(2d Cir. 1969) (quoting Remington Prods. Corp. v. American Aerovap, Inc., 192 
F.2d 872, 873 (2d Cir. 1951)). 
12. Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 229 (1922) (quoting Cove11 v. 
Heyman, 111 U.S. 176, 182 (1884)). 
13. 28 U.S.C. 5 2283 (1988) ("A court of the United States may not grant an  
injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by 
Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or 
effectuate its judgments."). 
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courts also face comity barriers since they cross jurisdictional 
lines.14 Although state courts may enjoin suits in other state 
courts, "[tlhey cannot interfere with the continued prosecution 
of pending federal actions nor can they bar commencement of a 
federal suit in the future? 
A. The ALI Proposal's Antisuit Injunction Provision 
The Proposal provides that when actions are transferred 
and consolidated, 
the transferee court may enjoin transactionally related pro- 
ceedings, or portions thereof, pending in any state or federal 
court whenever it determines that the continuation of those 
actions substantially impairs or interferes with the consoli- 
dated actions and that an injunction would promote the just, 
efficient, and fair resolution of the actions before it.16 
The Proposal recognized that even when cases are consoli- 
dated, some of the parties may pursue parallel litigation in 
other courts. Such a situation arises, for example, when plain- 
tiffs whose actions have been removed and consolidated "file 
anew in state court in the hope of outracing the transferee 
court to j~dgment."'~ The antisuit injunction is thus "neces- 
sary to provide for situations in which parties refuse to cooper- 
ate and the result is duplicative litigation that interferes with 
the transferee court's ability to manage or resolve expeditiously 
the claims before it? 
The Proposal sets out procedures and standards to be fol- 
lowed by a court in issuing an antisuit injunction. Many pro- 
visions are essentially codifications of existing antisuit injunc- 
tion practice, but there are some distinctive touches that may 
14. See James v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., 152 N.E.2d 858, 862 (stating that 
while an equity court "has power to restrain persons within its jurisdiction from 
instituting or proceeding with foreign action, . . . exercise of such power . . . has 
been deemed a matter of great delicacy, invoked with great restraint to avoid 
distressing conflicts and reciprocal interference with jurisdictionn) cert. denied, 358 
U.S. 915 (1958); see also J. E. Macey, Annotation, Injunction by State Court 
Against Action in Court of Another State, 6 A.L.R.2d 896 (1949). 
15. CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 296 (5th ed. 1994). 
However, "[slince the states cannot limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts, they 
cannot enjoin proceedings in federal courts, except to protect the jurisdiction of the 
state court over property in its custody or under its control." Id. 
16. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 4, 5 5.04(a). 
17. Id. 5 5.04(a) cmt. a, a t  264. 
18. Id. 
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affect the use of the device in other contexts such as in class 
actions, which will be discussed later in the article. 
1. Injunction should be as narrow as possible 
The Comments published with the Proposal caution that 
"[tlhe injunction should be as narrow as possible to meet its 
objective of protecting the transferee court from undue intru- 
sion."lg The fact that the Proposal allows enjoining of "por- 
tions" of actions in other courts enables a court to tailor an 
injunction to address the particular actions taken in the other 
court that interfere with the pending suit. For example, when 
discovery in another court impinges on the ability of the consol- 
idated suit to accomplish orderly and efficient discovery, the 
injunction can be tailored to forbid the discovery deemed to 
threaten interference, and should remain in force only until 
discovery in the consolidated case is completed and the threat 
of interference ends.20 
2. Transactionally related test 
The Proposal restricts application of injunctive power to 
"transactionally related proceedings," which is consistent with 
current antisuit injunction law. However, the standard can be 
devilishly hard to apply in particular cases. The Reporter's 
Notes say that "[alntisuit injunctions should be used against 
those cases that are truly duplicative, and not those only tan- 
gentially related."21 The example given is the classic inter- 
pleader case, State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. T a ~ h i r e , ~ ~  in 
which the Court limited the availability of injunctions to ac- 
tions involving the interpleader fund itself, and not to actions 
that simply related to  the fund in some way. Tashire, however, 
did not attempt to elucidate the boundaries of the relationship 
test. The Proposal's transactionally related test is similarly 
general. 
Difficult questions arise when parallel suits involve some 
parties and claims that are different from the aggregated suit. 
For example, a parallel suit may leave out some previously 
named parties, add some previously unnamed parties, or assert 
19. Id. at 265. 
20. Id. at 264-65. 
21. Id. 8 5.04 cmt. d, n.11, at 274. 
22. 386 US. 523, 533-37 (1967). 
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some different claims. A clever party seeking to avoid the con- 
straints of consolidation may purposely shape a parallel case to 
contain such differences. In the situation where there has been 
a decision to remove or transfer and then consolidate such 
parallel cases,23 there would already have been a determina- 
tion of a relationship between the cases that should normally 
satisfy the transactionally related test for an antisuit injunc- 
tion. But when an antisuit injunction is sought against prose- 
cuting a case that has not yet been consolidated, on the ground 
that it immediately interferes with disposition of the consoli- 
dated action, the transactionally related test will have to be 
independently satisfied. 
3. Factors to be considered 
The ALI Proposal sets out four factors to be considered in 
granting an antisuit i n jun~ t ion .~~  They are referred to as "dis- 
cretionary" in the  comment^,^' suggesting a balancing ap- 
proach. These factors share some similarities with the three 
exceptions in the Anti-Injunction but the legislation 
contemplated by the Proposal is intended to function as an 
additional, express exception to the Act. The Comments state 
that the proposed statute accords "express injunctive power" to 
the transferee court "to avoid the possibility of restrictions 
imposed by the Anti-Injunction Act."27 Indeed, the Comments 
assert a strong federal court interest, overriding the deference 
to state interests in the Anti-Injunction Act, that warrants such 
exception: 
As with interpleader, no one state may have the power to 
effect a solution that will reach across state boundaries; a 
national solution requires the assertion of federal power. 
Thus, in addition to the federal judicial system's interest in 
conserving its own resources, the federal government has an 
23. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 4, 5 3.01 (providing for trans- 
fer and consolidation of actions commenced in different federal district courts); id. 
5 5.01 (providing for removal to and consolidation in federal court of civil actions 
pending in one or more state courts). 
24. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 4, § 5.04(b). 
25. Id. 5 5.04 cmt. d, at 271. 
26. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
27. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 4, 5 5.04 cmt. b, at 267. Al- 
though a statutory exception need not expressly mention injunctions, see Mitchum 
v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), the drafters felt explicit authority would avoid un- 
certainty. 
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interest, if not an obligation, to provide a procedure to remedy 
this interstate problem. This interest necessarily may over- 
come the interests of an individual state in providing a forum 
for its litigants in appropriate circumstances, particularly 
when the allowance of the state action prevents the federal 
court from effectuating its legitimate federal  objective^.^' 
a. How far the individual actions have progressed. The 
factors to be considered in granting an antisuit injunction are 
reflective of existing practice, with some useful clarifications. 
The f i rs t"how far the actions to be enjoined have pro- 
gre~sed"~~-goes to concerns of both comity and efficiency. 
Nothing is more disruptive of existing expectations than issu- 
ance of an antisuit injunction by the judge in a newly aggregat- 
ed case that prevents further proceedings in cases that have 
long been on the docket and are ready to go to trial. Take, for 
example, an injunctive dispute between two federal district 
courts involving the school asbestos litigati~n.~' The U.S. Dis- 
trict Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania certified a 
mandatory nationwide class of schools against three major 
asbestos producers for costs incurred in removing asbestos. In 
the certification order, the court enjoined class members from 
filing new suits, or from prosecuting pending suits, against the 
defendants .31 
At that time, two suits by Texas school districts had been 
pending for three years in the U.S. District Court for the East- 
ern District of Texas and were set for trial in three months.32 
Upon learning of the Pennsylvania court's injunction, the plain- 
tiffs obtained an injunction from the Texas court enjoining both 
plaintiffs and defendants from prosecuting or defending the 
cases "in any other court" and enjoining "all proceedings in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn- 
sylvania which entail in any manner the controversy in the 
28. COMPLEX LI~GATION PROPOSAL, supra note 4, 8 5.04 cmt. c, a t  270. 
29. Id. 4 5.04(b)(l). 
30. The dispute is described in more detail in Edward F. Sherman, Class Ac- 
tions and Duplicative Litigation, 62 IND. L.J. 507, 519-22 (1987). 
31. In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., unpublished order (April 13, 1984) (by Judge 
James Kelly), described in In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 422, 426 (E.D. Pa. 
1984), opinion amended, 107 F.R.D. 215 (1985), and affd in part, rev'd in part, 789 
F.2d 996 (3d Cir.), and cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852 (U.S.). 
32. See Dayton Indep. Sch. Dist. v. United States Gypsum Co., Civ. Ac. No. 
B-81-277-CA (E.D. Tex., filed Apr. 22, 1981); Evadale Indep. Sch. Dist. v. United 
States Gypsum Co., Civ. Ac. No. B-81-293-CA (E.D. Tex., filed Apr. 27, 1981) (con- 
solidated Mar. 22, 1983). 
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above styled and numbered cause."33 The order noted that the 
cases before the Texas court were first in time, but expressed 
reluctance "to determine choice of forum by rigid mechanical 
application of a general rule."34 It relied instead on "practical 
and equitable realities" including the considerable investment 
of time and effort in holding pretrial conferences and hearings, 
the trial settings, and the fact that subsuming these two cases 
under the class action "would cause prodigious delay and 
thwart j~stice."~ A month later, the Pennsylvania court modi- 
fied its injunction to exclude existing suits.36 
Clearly, the two Texas cases should not have been subject- 
ed to the antisuit injunction. They had progressed too far to 
justify requiring them to join an aggregated case that might be 
years away from settlement or trial. However, antisuit injunc- 
tions are often issued as a prophylactic measure against pend- 
ing and future litigation without judicial consideration of all 
the individual pending cases. The class in the asbestos school 
litigation was estimated at  8,500 schools, and the Pennsylvania 
court was probably unaware of the particular circumstances of 
the Texas cases, or indeed, of other pending cases. 
If, as the ALI Proposal contemplates, antisuit injunctions 
may be a normal complement to consolidation, careful scrutiny 
of the status of pending cases is necessary. A court should 
require parties moving for an injunction to report on the status 
of all known pending cases and should assess whether allowing 
them to go forward would really interfere with the proper dis- 
position of the consolidated action. If time is truly of the es- 
sence-for example, if there is reason to believe that irrepa- 
rable actions will be taken in pending cases if an injunction 
does not issue immediately-a court might be required to issue 
an injunction and to allow parties whose cases are enjoined to 
petition within a reasonable time for exclusion from the injunc- 
tion. 
There is another aspect of mass duplicative litigation that 
may, however, undermine the rationale for not enjoining the 
pending Texas cases. Aggregation of all similar cases through 
33. Dayton Indep. Sch. Dist., unpublished order of June 28, 1984 (by Judge 
Robert M. Parker), at 7. 
34. Id. at 3. 
35. Id. at 4-5. 
36. In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., 594 F. Supp. 178, 179 (E.D. Pa. 1984). The 
certification of a mandatory class was ultimately reversed on appeal. In re Asbestos 
Sch. Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 998-99 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U S .  852, 915 (1986). 
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consolidation or class action can provide a window of opportuni- 
ty for settlement that would not exist if the cases were individ- 
ually litigated. Defendants may be willing to make a global 
settlement of all claims against them only if they can be as- 
sured that the settlement will resolve their total liability.37 In 
addition, if individual cases are allowed to be tried outside the 
aggregated action, substantial funds to pay damages may be 
siphoned off. If the defendants are shaky financially, releasing 
individual cases from aggregate treatment could result in bank- 
ruptcy. Such circumstances may be grounds for certifying a 
mandatory class action in which the plaintiffs may not opt 
In consolidated cases of the type contemplated by the 
Proposal, the antisuit injunction may serve as a sort of surro- 
gate for a mandatory class action by prohibiting individual 
litigation that would disrupt the resolution of the aggregated 
case. 
Releasing the pending Texas cases from the injunction was 
not likely to interfere with the resolution of the school asbestos 
litigation. However, if a large number of such cases went for- 
ward outside the class action, the possibility of settling the 
class litigation might have been imperiled. The ALI Proposal 
does not address these kinds of considerations relating to the 
propriety of antisuit injunctions, perhaps in the belief that they 
are germane only to class actions. Yet consolidation is in many 
ways the functional equivalent of a class action, and the role of 
the antisuit injunction in holding together an aggregated case 
to enhance settlement should not be ignored. 
b. Degree of duplication. The second factor to be consid- 
ered in granting an antisuit injunction under the Proposal is 
the degree to which the actions pending in other courts are 
duplicative of the consolidated  proceeding^.^^ This factor 
serves both economy/efficiency and inconsistent outcome con- 
37. See infia part I.B.3.b. 
38. See In  re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 789-90 
(E.D.N.Y. 1980) (finding a mandatory Rule 23(b)(l)(B) class action appropriate if 
there is a substantial probability that the limited h n d  represented by defendants' 
assets would be exceeded), reh'g denied in part, 534 FSupp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), 
and modified in part, 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), and mandamus denied, 725 
F.2d 858 (2d Cir.), and cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984). But see In re Northern 
Dist. of Cal. Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 851 (9th Cir. 
1982) (barring Rule 23(b)(l)(B) certification "unless separate actions 'inescapably 
will alter the substance of the rights of others having similar claims'" (citations 
omitted)), cert. denied, 459 US. 1171 (1983)). 
39. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 4, 5 5.04(b)(2). 
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cerns, and therefore overlaps with the threshold question as to 
whether the cases are transactionally related. The Comments 
warn that "[blecause issues vary in significance, this inquiry 
into the level of duplication cannot be reduced to some formula- 
ic determination of minimum ~ommona l i ty .~~  Thus, the sav- 
ings resulting from unitary adjudication of a single, vital issue 
might warrant an injunction, while the existence of a number 
of common issues of lesser importance might not justify prohib- 
iting individual adjudications. The focus would seem to be on 
whether the individual cases are closely enough related to the 
consolidated case that there would be a significant repetition of 
evidence and witne~ses.~' 
c. Whether there are issues of federal law. The third 
factor in determining the propriety of an antisuit injunction 
focuses directly on federalism concerns-whether the actions to 
be enjoined involve issues or claims of federal law.42 If state 
suits involve predominantly state issues, comity and abstention 
may dictate against an injunction. The Comments call on the 
judge to "weigh the benefits of aggregation against the poten- 
tial intrusion on state sovereignty.yy43 The greater the signifi- 
cance of federal issues, the less likely it is that an injunction 
would intrude on legitimate state interests. But if cases are 
dominated by state issues, "enjoining their prosecution in a 
state court should require a strong finding that the benefits of 
consolidation in the transferee court [otherwise] would be un- 
der~nined."~~ Such a finding might be justified if the state 
action were parallel or if the plaintiffs had filed the action after 
the order to transfer and consolidate "in an effort to engage in 
a race to judgment or to avoid the governing law chosen under 
the applicable federal choice of law  standard^."^ 
d. Interests of nonparties. The last factor in the decision 
whether to issue an antisuit injunction relates to the interests 
of persons whose cases were not consolidated. Normally, 
nonparties to the consolidated litigation would not be subject to 
an injunction. However, the ALI Proposal contemplates the 
possibility that nonparties will be enjoined so long as the con- 
40. Id. § 5.04 cmt. d, a t  272. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 5.04(b)(3). 




solidating court has personal jurisdiction over them. The juris- 
dictional requirement can easily be met because the Proposal 
would expand the jurisdictional power of the transferee court to 
assert jurisdiction wherever the nonparties may be located.46 
In support of this expansion, the Reporter's Notes cite the in- 
terpleader statute that affords similar nationwide jurisdiction 
to federal courts and empowers them to enjoin all suits brought 
by adverse claimants to a fund, obligation, or  re^.^? 
Exclusion of a case from consolidation would reflect an 
initial determination that individual litigation would not en- 
danger the aggregated proceeding. However, the aggregation 
decision may sometimes be neither as comprehensive nor as 
far-sighted as it should be. In addition, matters may arise later 
concerning nonparty litigation that would undermine the effec- 
tive disposition of the consolidated case. For example, discovery 
undertaken in an individual suit may interfere directly with 
discovery management in the consolidated litigation. The 
Reporter's Notes indicate that in such a case, "an injunction 
prohibiting certain discovery for a short time until the parties 
in the consolidated suit have completed it might be appropri- 
ate."48 
B. Antisuit Injunction Practice in Class Actions 
The provision for antisuit injunctions in the ALI Proposal 
is focused on the transfer-removal-consolidation scheme that 
the Proposal has adopted. However, the greatest need for 
antisuit injunctions in mass duplicative litigation today is prob- 
ably in class actions. Although the Proposal does not address 
class actions, its rationale for the use of antisuit injunctions 
and its procedures and standards for their issuance are rele- 
vant to class actions. The class-action context poses additional 
and sometimes different issues with which the federal courts 
have wrestled during the past several years. 
1. Traditional Anti-Injunction Act constraints 
The expansion of the antisuit injunction in the class-action 
context has been the product of necessity, particularly arising 
from mass duplicative litigation in federal courts in which the 
46. Id. 4 5.04 cmt. b, n.7, at 268-69. 
47. Id. at 269 (citing 28 U.S.C. $ 2361 (1988)). 
48. Id. 4 5.04 cmt. d, at 273. 
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risk of interference by state-court suits is particularly vexing. 
Constraints on antisuit injunctions in class actions arise fkom 
the Anti-Injunction Act, principles of federalism, and limita- 
tions on the equitable injunctive power. 
The Anti-Injunction Act imposes the most serious con- 
straint on the use of antisuit injunctions by class-action courts. 
There is no express "class-action" exception to the Anti-Injunc- 
tion Act in Rule 23." This contrasts with statutory interplead- 
er which provides that a district court may restrain all claim- 
ants "fkom instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in any 
State or United States court affecting the property, instrument 
or obligation involved in the interpleader action."50 The ALI 
Proposal's provision of an express exception to the Anti-Injunc- 
tion Act for antisuit injunctions under its consolidation scheme 
might also serve as a model for an exception for class ac- 
t i o n ~ . ~ ~  In the absence of an exception, however, antisuit in- 
junctions in class actions have had to be shoe-horned into one 
of the three exceptions in the Act. 
49. I t  might be argued that Rule 23(d), which allows a court to "make appro- 
priate orders" to determine the course of proceedings, should be construed as an 
express exception. See Steven M. Larimore, Exploring the Interface Between Rule 23 
Class Actions and the Anti-Injunction Act, 18 GA. L. REV. 259, 274-84 (1984); 
Sherman, supra note 30, a t  528-33. This position has not been accepted by the 
courts. See In re Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328, 335 (2d Cir. 1985); Piambino 
v. Bailey, 610 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1980). "This is probably the correct result, be- 
cause Rule 83 commands that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not to 
affect basic jurisdictional statutes, and the 'jurisdiction' to be protected in these 
class actions is actually made possible by Rule 23 itself." Diane P. Wood, Fine- 
Tuning Judicial Federalism: A Proposal for Reform of the Anti-Injunction Act, 1990 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 289, 315. 
50. 28 U.S.C. 9 2361 (1988). However, a court may only exercise this authori- 
ty when a deposit has been made or a bond provided by the stakeholder as re- 
quired by the statute. Austin v. Texas-Ohio Gas Co., 218 F.2d 739, 745 (5th Cir. 
1955). 
51. Professor (now Judge) Wood proposed amending 28 U.S.C. 5 2283 to add 
an exception that would allow antisuit injunctions "when necessary to ensure the 
effectiveness of a class action certified under federal statutes or rules, or 
multidistrict litigation ordered pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 9 1407, or court-ordered arbi- 
tration, or in aid of a claim for interpleader." Wood, supra note 49, at  320. The 
standard for this exception ("when necessw to ensure the effectiveness of a [certi- 
fied] class actionn) is vague, as is the standard in the ALI Proposal ("whenever 
[the court] determines that the continuation of those actions substantially impairs 
or interferes with the consolidated actionsn). The federalism concerns expressed in 
the Anti-Injunction Act might be better served by a narrower exception. One might 
attempt, for example, to tailor an exception to those precise situations in which 
duplicative state-court suits truly interfere with the effectiveness of a federalcourt 
aggregated case and in which the federal interest should clearly be given promi- 
nence. Drafting such a rule, however, would not be an easy task. 
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The second exception-"necessary in aid of its jurisdic- 
tion"-holds the most promise for avoiding the Act in mass 
duplicative litigation. It might seem to apply if duplicative 
suits by class members would disrupt a class action by siphon- 
ing off class members. However, this exception "has often been 
construed with the greatest nineteenth century rigor the courts 
can muster."52 The Supreme Court's 1922 decision in Kline v. 
Burke Construction Co. distinguished between in rem and in 
personam actions, finding that historical equity practice would 
only permit enjoining of duplicative litigation when necessary 
to prevent interference with a court's jurisdiction over a  re^.^^ 
Duplicative in personam actions, in contrast, had to be allowed 
to proceed concurrently, and "an injunction could not issue to 
restrain a state action in personam involving the same subject 
matter from going on at the same time."" Although school 
desegregation cases were analogized to in rern actions to justify 
enjoining state suits that would undermine the remedy and 
effective compliance by the parties,55 the Supreme Court stat- 
ed with assurance in 1977 that it had "never viewed parallel in 
personam actions as interfering with" a court's jur isdi~t ion.~~ 
The limitations that this view imposes on the ability of a 
federal court to prevent interference with a pending class ac- 
tion can be seen in the In re Federal Skywalk Cases." There, 
the district court certified a mandatory class of all persons with 
claims arising out of the collapse of skywalks in the Hyatt 
Regency Hotel in Kansas City in 1981. The court also issued an 
antisuit injunction preventing class members from settling 
their punitive damage claims in existing suits until the class- 
action trial was concluded. The court reasoned that the first 
litigants to obtain punitive damages might exhaust the fund of 
available resources or might curtail the ability of other litigants 
to receive punitive-damage awards.58 The Eighth Circuit 
found that the mandatory class certification constituted an 
injunction that violated the Anti-Injunction Act, rejecting anal- 
52. Wood, supra note 49, at 301. 
53. 260 U.S. 226, 229-32 (1922). 
54. Sherman, supra note 30, at 532 (quoting 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, 
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 'j[ 23.92, at 23-570 (2d ed., 1985)). 
55. WRIGHT, supra note 15, at 303 n.50. 
56. Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 642 (1977). 
57. 93 F.R.D. 415, 424-25 (W.D. Mo.), vacated, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), and 
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982). 
58. Skywalk, 93 F.R.D. at 425-28. 
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ogies to federal interpleader jurisdiction and finding that the 
risk of exhausting the resources of a defendant by individual 
punitive damages did not warrant invoking the "in aid of its 
jurisdiction" exception.5g 
2. A modest expansion of antisuit injunctive powers 
In the last decade, there has been a modest expansion of 
federal courts' antisuit injunctive powers through application 
and interpretation of the Anti-Injunction Act and the All Writs 
Act?' Two situations have emerged in which courts have al- 
lowed resort to antisuit injunctions to prevent class members 
from litigating their suits individually. 
The first occurs when cases that were consolidated in a 
federal court under Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) proceed- 
ings6l have progressed to the stage of imminent settlement. 
For example, in In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litiga- 
t i ~ n , ~ '  the district court certified as a mandatory class action 
fifty-two private antitrust suits previously consolidated under 
MDL. The Fifth Circuit upheld the mandatory class action and 
the court's injunction which prevented the class members from 
filing suit in state courts. The circuit court invoked both the "in 
aid of its jurisdiction" and "to protect or effectuate its judg- 
ments" exceptions of the Anti-Injunction stressing that 
the district court had approved the settlements with most of 
the defendants at  the time it issued the injunction. 
In re Baldwin-United Corp.64 further extended the doc- 
trine that an antisuit injunction was justified to protect irnmi- 
nent settlement of consolidated cases. In In re Baldwin, over 
one hundred federal securities suits by 100,000 holders of an- 
nuities issued by the now bankrupt Baldwin-United had been 
59. Skywalk, 680 F.2d at  1182-84. There is a similarity between the require- 
ment for a mandatory "limited fundn class action under Rule 23(b)(l)(B) (see infra 
note 70 for requirements of a "limited fundn) and for the' "in aid of its jurisdictionn 
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. Both can be seen as requiring an essentially 
in rem action. However, it would be a mistake to conclude that only mandatory 
class actions can satisfy that exception under the Anti-Injunction Act. Courts have 
upheld antisuit injunctions even in Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out class actions. See In re 
Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1985). 
60. 28 U.S.C. 5 1651(a) (1988). 
61. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
62. 80 F.R.D. 244 (S.D. Tex. 1978), afd, 659 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 
1981). 
63. Corrugated Containers, 659 F.2d a t  1334-35. 
64. 770 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1985). 
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consolidated under MDL. After two years of negotiations and 
with the parties nearing settlement, the federal district court 
approved a nationwide opt-out class action on behalf of all 
holders of the annuities for the purpose of settlement. When 
certain state attorneys general threatened to sue in state 
courts on behalf of resident class members who were opposed to 
the settlements, the court enjoined such suits. The Second 
Circuit upheld the injunction under the "in aid of its jurisdic- 
tion" exception, finding the imminent settlement to be "the 
virtual equivalent of a  re^."^^ It found the settlement was 
close to finalization and that "the potential for an onslaught of 
state actions . . . threatened to 'seriously impair the federal 
court's flexibility and authority' to approve settlements in the 
multi-district l i t igat i~n."~~ 
A similar approach was taken in the mass torts case of In 
re Asbestos School L i t i g ~ t i o n . ~ ~  There, the Third Circuit up- 
held an antisuit injunction against prosecuting suits outside 
the class action, pending the district court's ruling on a pro- 
posed settlement. "[Tlhis court's ability to oversee a possible 
settlement," it said, "would be 'seriously impaired' by the con- 
tinuing litigation of parallel actions? 
The second situation warranting the issuance of an 
antisuit injunction arises out of class actions related to bank- 
ruptcy. The bankruptcy of Johns-Manville led to a settlement 
and the creation of a trust for the benefit of asbestos vic- 
t i m ~ . ~ ~  When unexpectedly large claims and transaction costs 
threatened the viability of the trust, Judge Jack Weinstein, 
who had continuing jurisdiction due to the bankruptcy, certified 
a mandatory 'limited fund" class of claimants to the trust to 
facilitate a settlement that would revise the trust arrange- 
ment.?' He also issued a nationwide injunction against prose- 
65. Id. a t  337. 
66. Id. a t  337 (citations omitted). 
67. No. 83-0268, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5142 (E.D. Pa. April 16, 1991), aff'd 
mem., 950 F.2d 723 (3d Cir. 1991). 
68. Id. a t  *6. 
69. In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 
120 B.R. 648, 653 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
70. Id. A "limited fund" class is the paradigm of a Rule 23(b)(l)(B) class 
action in which individual adjudications would as a practical matter impair the 
ability of the putative class members to protect their interests. A "limited fund" 
exists "where the claims of all plaintiffs exceed[] the assets of the defendant and 
hence to allow any group of individuals to be fully compensated would impair the 
rights of those not in court." Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 
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cution of any claims against the trust,?' relying on the 
"imminency of settlement" rationaleT2 to invoke the "in aid of 
its jurisdiction" exception to the Anti-Injunction Act: 
The courts are in the process of reviewing the stipulation of 
settlement of the proposed class action encompassing the 
claims of all beneficiaries of the Trust. At this critical junc- 
ture, the courts must be able to continue-confident that the 
assets available to settle the case will remain intact. An in- 
junction of all proceedings is necessary to implement the 
terms of the settlement and to protect the courts' jurisdiction 
over the class action.73 
Judge Weinstein also invoked the All Writs Act,74 "[wlhether 
viewed as an affirmative grant of power to the courts or an 
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act," as authority for courts "to 
certify a national class action and to stay pending federal and 
state cases brought on behalf of class members."75 
3. Injunctive developments in global class-action settlements 
The extension of class-action treatment to mass tortsT6 
1340 n.9 (9th Cir. 1976). 
71. In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 120 B.R. at  653-54. A mandato- 
ry class action was also certified for claimants against Eagle-Picher, a major manu- 
facturer of asbestos which was in severe financial difficulty, and all actions against 
i t  were similarly enjoined nationwide. In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig. (In 
re Eagle-Picher Indus.), 134 F.R.D. 32 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
72. See In re Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1985); Standard 
Microsystems Corp. v. Texas Instruments Inc., 916 F.2d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 1990) (stat- 
ing that a stay of proceedings in state court is appropriate under the "in aid of its 
jurisdiction" exception "where a federal court is on the verge of settling a complex 
matter, and state court proceedings may undermine its ability to achieve that ob- 
jective"). Noting the analogy drawn between class-action litigation and in rem ac- 
tions in Baldwin-United, Judge Weinstein found the analogy even stronger in the 
Manville litigation "since the Trust constitute[dl a res that ha[dl been created in a 
bankruptcy proceeding to compensate all injuries resulting from Manville asbestos- 
containing products." In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 120 B.R. a t  657. 
73. In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 120 B.R. a t  656. 
74. 28 U.S.C. 8 1651(a) (1988). The All Writs Act reads: "The Supreme Court 
and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or 
appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and 
principles of law." Id. 
75. In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 120 B.R. a t  656. 
76. The 1966 Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 23 state: "A 'mass accident' 
resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class 
action because of the likelihood that significant questions, not only of damages but 
of liability and defenses to liability, would be present, affecting the individuals in 
different ways." 39 F.R.D. 69, 103 (1966). 'While the initial trend appeared to 
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has led to a number of global settlements aimed at  buying 
peace for the defendants against all present (and in some cases 
future) claimants. Three prominent global class-action settle- 
ments have been approved by federal courts in the last two 
years,77 and in all three cases, antisuit injunctions were a crit- 
ical, bargained-for feature. The injunctive issues involved com- 
plicated questions of jurisdiction, due process, opt-out rights, 
and judicial authority under the Anti-Injunction Act and All 
Writs Act. 
a. Georgine: Fending o f f  duplicative suits from every quar- 
ter. The first of the global class actions, Georgine v. Amchem 
P r o d u ~ t s , ~ ~  involved a settlement with a consortium of twenty 
asbestos manufacturers. As has become the practice in a num- 
ber of mass-tort settlements, motions for stipulation of settle- 
ment and for certification of a settlement class were filed si- 
multaneously.7g These motions sought certification of a 
nonmandatory Rule 23(b)(3) class, with opt-out rights, defined 
as all persons in the U.S. who had been exposed occupationally 
or derivatively in the household to defendants' asbestos prod- 
ucts, and who had not yet filed suit, as to all claims of injury 
whether or not disease had been manifested." The defendants 
were obviously seeking and, in fact, obtained as a condition for 
paying the $1.2 billion settlement that all claims present and 
future would be extinguished by the class-action judgment. The 
stipulation of settlement likewise provided that once the court 
approved the settlement, all class members would be enjoined 
from instituting or maintaining any claim or action for asbes- 
tos-related injuries against a defendant.81 
Within two weeks after the stipulation of settlement and 
class certification motions were filed, the district court provi- 
preclude the use of class actions in mass torts, the overwhelming burden of these 
cases in the twenty years since the Advisory Notes were published has revived 
efforts to utilize the device to fashion equitable and efficient remedies." In re Joint 
E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 807 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated, 
982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992), and modified on reh'g, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993). 
77. For a criticism of the three global class-action settlements which are dis- 
cussed in this article, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the 
Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343 (1995). 
78. 878 F. Supp. 716 (E.D. Pa. 1994). The litigation that has come to be 
known as Georgine was originally titled Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 834 F. 
Supp. 1437 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 
79. See Carlough v. Amchem Prods., 10 F.3d 189, 193 (3d Cir. 1993). 
80. Id. at  194-95. 
81. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., 878 F. Supp. a t  721-22. 
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sionally approved the class action, but there was considerable 
opposition to the settlement by putative class members. Two 
months after filing, and before the court had established a 
period for opt-out, some absent class members filed a class- 
action complaint in a West Virginia court seeking to represent 
class members who had been exposed in West Virginia." They 
sought a declaratory judgment that the proposed global settle- 
ment in federal court was not binding on the class members 
because of lack of jurisdiction and other defects.83 In response, 
the defendants obtained from the federal court a preliminary 
injunction forbidding the West Virginia class members from 
prosecuting their suit or from pursuing "duplicative litigation" 
in any other forum." 
On appeal of the injunction, the Third Circuit held that the 
district court lacked power to enjoin parallel litigation when 
the absent class members, at  the time the injunction was is- 
sued, had not been given the opportunity to opt Apply- 
ing the Supreme Court's decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
S h ~ t t s , ~ ~  the court found that absent class members can only 
be bound by a class-action damages judgment,87 in the ab- 
sence of minimum contacts, if they are provided timely notice 
and an opportunity to opt out. By the time the appeal was 
decided, however, the district court had established an opt-out 
period and the class members still had an opportunity to opt- 
out. The circuit court found that the opportunity of the class 
members to opt out remedied the Shutts problem.88 The cir- 
82. See Carlough, 10 F.3d a t  195-96 (describing Gore v. Amchem Prods., No. 
93-C-195 (Cir. Ct. of Monogalia County, W. Va.)). 
83. Carlough, 10 F.3d at  195. See infra note 98 for the argument against 
jurisdiction. 
84. Carlough, 10 F.3d at  196. 
85. Id. at 200. 
86. 472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
87. The Court in Shutts limited its holding to "those class actions which seek 
to bind known plaintiffs concerning claims wholly or predominately for money judg- 
ments" and expressed "no view concerning other types of class actions, such as 
those seeking equitable relief." Id. a t  811-12 n.3. A prominently held view is that 
in Rule 23(b)(l) and (2) class actions, a court can assert jurisdiction over absent 
plaintiff class members who lack minimum contacts with the forum even though 
there is no opt-out right. See Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and 
Choice of Law in Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 96 
YALE L.J. 1, 54 (1986). But see Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386, 392 
(9th Cir. 19921, cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 1359 (1994) (finding that class members 
in a Rule 23(b)(l) and (2) class action were denied due process by not being al- 
lowed to opt out). 
88. Carlough, 10 F.3d at  199-201. 
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cuit court went on to approve the antisuit injunction as neces- 
sary to protect the court's jurisdiction to accomplish the pro- 
posed settlement?' It found authority in the Anti-Injunction 
Act and All Writs Act, endorsing the approach taken in the As- 
bestos School Litigation and Baldwin-United that the 
imminency of a class-action settlement warranted an injunction 
"in aid of its jurisdi~tion."'~ 
One might ask what was accomplished by enjoining the 
West Virginia class action when the persons who brought that 
suit, as well as other putative class members, could still opt out 
of the global class action. The answer lies in the fact that the 
West Virginia suit sought much more than just the right of 
individual class members to opt out. It sought to prevent both a 
global settlement that would include future claimants and a 
nationwide class action by carving out a state class action." 
The right to opt out need not be fatal to a global settlement if, 
as actually did occur here, the bulk of the class members 
choose not to opt out. But the West Virginia suit sought to 
undermine the viability of the class-action structure and settle- 
ment, thereby satisfying the rigorous standard of the "in aid of 
its jurisdiction" exception that an injunction must be necessary 
"'to prevent a state court from so interfering with a federal 
court's consideration or disposition of a case as to seriously 
impair the federal court's flexibility and authority to decide 
that case."'92 Enjoining the West Virginia action thus helped 
to presewe the global character of the federal class and the 
attendant efficacy of the settlement. 
89. Id. at  203. The Third Circuit cited, inter alia, In re Corrugated Container 
Antitrust Litig., 659 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 
936 (1982); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1985); In re Asbes- 
tos Sch. Litig., 1991 WL 61156 (E.D. Pa. April 16, 1991), aff'd men., 950 F.2d 723 
(3d Cir. 1991); Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 877, 881 (11th Cir. 
1989) (stating that a parallel state suit may be enjoined under the "necessary in 
aid of its jurisdiction" exception); James v. Bellotti, 733 F.2d 989, 993-94 (1st Cir. 
1984) (finding an injunction against state-court suits justified by a provisionally 
approved settlement). 
90. Carlough, 10 F.3d at  201-03. 
91. "[Tlhe stated purpose of the Gore suit is to challenge the propriety of the 
federal class action, which the district court characterized as a preemptive strike 
against the viability of the federal suit, and to obtain rulings from the West Vir- 
ginia state court regarding the West Virginia class members' right to opt out of 
the federal action." Id. a t  203. 
92. In re Glenn W. Turner Enters. Litig., 521 F.2d 775, 780 (3d Cir. 1975) 
(quoting Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 
281, 295 (1970)). 
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Despite success in thwarting the West Virginia suit, the 
global settlement in Georgine faced further threats of 
duplicative litigation. Within the first half-year after the opt- 
out period ended, some 2,500 individual suits were filed in 
courts around the country by class members who had not time- 
ly filed their opt out.93 The defendants, rather than seeking to 
enforce the antisuit provision of the settlement agreement:4 
sought a class-wide injunction forbidding class members from 
initiating or prosecuting asbestos-related claims in duplicative 
proceedings. The court granted the injunction, finding that the 
existence of 2,500 suits "demonstrates a strong likelihood that 
these state court proceedings would seriously impair this 
Court's authority to preside over the Georgine ~ett lement ."~~ 
According to the court such suits would force the defendants "to 
defend the settled claims of class members in multiple jurisdic- 
tions," would "undercut the financial planning and claims pro- 
cedures provided in the Stipulation," and would "jeopardize the 
security of the existence of a fund to compensate class members 
for their inj~ries."'~ 
The final chapter in the Georgine attempt to curb 
duplicative litigation was written when Casimir Ballonis filed 
suit in a Maryland state court ten months after the opt-out 
period ended.g7 Mr. Ballonis alleged that he had only recently 
been diagnosed as having mesothelioma (a probably fatal can- 
cer) resulting from exposure to the defendants' asbestos. He 
had not opted out of the class, being unaware of his asbestos- 
related disease. Mr. Ballonis' claim was precisely the type of 
claim that had concerned those who had opposed inclusion of 
potential claimants in the Georgine class.98 The defendants 
93. Georgine v. Amchem Prods., 878 F. Supp. 716, 721 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
94. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 81. 
95. Id. at 722. 
96. Id. 
97. Georgine v. Amchem Prods., 1995 WL 422792, at *3 (E.D. Pa. April 1, 
1995). 
98. These opponents argued that "the 'exposure only' plaintiffs lacked stand- 
ing to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court to decide their claims based on 
mere exposure to asbestos." Initial Brief of Appellants on Appeal from Preliminary 
Injunction at 36, Georgine v. Amchem Prods., (3d Cir. 1995) (filed Feb. 6, 1995) 
(No. 941925). Because exposure only plaintiffs had sustained "no physical harm as 
a result of their exposure, [they] sought relief only for their increased risk of de- 
veloping asbestos-related disease, their fear of contracting such a disease, and their 
need for medical surveillance to allow the early detection of an asbestos-related ill- 
ness," demonstrating that these plaintiffs lacked a judicially cognizable claim or 
injury. Id. Second, the opponents of including future claimants noted that 
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moved to hold Mr. Ballonis and his lawyer in contempt for 
prosecuting his suit in violation of the court's antisuit injunc- 
tion. Citing its prior findings that the notice to the class by 
publication was adequate and the settlement was fair," the 
court rejected Mr. Ballonis' argument that it should lift the 
injunction because it was unfair to him (he would have to settle 
his case within the $37,000 to $60,000 range in the settlement 
schedule while verdicts in mesothelioma cases generally exceed 
a million dollars).'00 Instead, the court granted the 
defendants' motion, holding Mr. Ballonis and his attorney in 
contempt for pursuing the Maryland suit by seeking discovery 
and ordering them to cease all prosec~tion.'~' 
The Ballonis holding is a logical extension of the use of 
antisuit injunctions in the global settlement of "futures" class 
actions. If defendants are really to be accorded peace by global 
settlements, even apparent injustice to a class member who 
may not have had actual notice of the right to opt out and who 
was unaware that he had a present medical condition is to be 
countenanced. It was the "futures" class that particularly dic- 
tated this harsh result in Georgine; members of a "futures'' 
class who have not manifested an injury are less likely to get 
actual notice because they may not realize that a published 
notice applies to them. However, even without a "futures" class, 
the antisuit injunction can be Draconian. "Present'' class mem- 
bers who have manifested disease may also not see the pub- 
lished notice and may miss their opportunity to opt out. Once 
an antisuit injunction is issued, judges tend to admit few ex- 
ceptions. If the injunction were lifted for Mr. Ballonis, "it argu- 
ably would have to be lifted for countless other plaintiffs who 
are similarly situated or who claim that they would be better 
The gross unfairness of allowing named plaintiffs to bargain away the 
rights of absent class members with respect to claims which are outside 
the scope of their capacity as class representatives is particularly severe 
when the claims being released do not even yet exist. . . . If the 'expo- 
sure only' class representatives wish to trade their own unaccrued, poten- 
tial asbestos claims for the terms of the proposed settlement, that is their 
business and their choice. But the district court cannot mandate that all 
persons who have ever been exposed to the CCR members' asbestos-con- 
taining products must also give up their unaccrued, potential future 
rights. 
Id. at 68. 
99. Georgine, 1995 WL 422792 at *4. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at "10. 
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off litigating their individual claims," which "would lead to the 
disintegration of the Georgine settlement with substantial 
prejudice to the . . . defendants and the class generally."lo2 
b. Breast Implant Litigation: Trying to hold the class to- 
gether for settlement possibilities. The second global class action 
in which antisuit injunctions have been invoked is the In re 
Silicone Gel Breast Implant Products Liability Litigation .Io3 
In this litigation, pending federal court cases against the man- 
ufacturers of breast implants were consolidated under MDL in 
the federal court in the northern District of Alabama.lo4 A 
global class-action settlement was preliminarily approved by 
Judge Sam Pointer for all claims, present and future, arising 
from a breast implant manufactured by the settling defen- 
dants.lo5 Judge Pointer ordered notice by publication and 
established an opt-out period during which putative class mem- 
bers were enjoined from going to trial in any other court.'06 
Upon approving the settlement after the opt-out period expired, 
Judge Pointer enjoined class members f?om instituting or pros- 
ecuting any claims against the settling defendants.'" The 
viability of the Breast Implant Litigation settlement was subse- 
quently undermined by an unexpectedly large number of claim- 
ants,lo8 but the antisuit injunction remained in effect while 
negotiations and maneuvering continued. 
Unlike Georgine, there was no substantial direct disobedi- 
ence of the antisuit injunction by class members. The antisuit 
injunction played a less significant role than in Georgine, and 
the opt-out class action was not as all-inclusive (due in part to 
the inability to remove and consolidate with the MDL action 
many state-court cases as to which there was no diversity juris- 
diction).log However, despite the demise of the original global 
102. Id. at *11. 
103. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 1098 
(J.P.M.L. 1992). 
104. Id. at 1101. 
105. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 1994 WL 114580 
(N.D. Ala. April 1, 1995). 
106. Id. at *6-*8. There was also to be a unique, second opt-out period after 
an evaluation of available resources following receipt of claims. 
107. Id. at *7. 
108. See S. Gale Dick, Can Implant Settlement Be Saved? 13 ALTERNATIVES TO
THE HIGH COST OF LITIG. 109 (1995); Barry Meier, Judge Discloses New Details on 
Settlement of Implant Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1995, at  A10. 
109. See Joseph Nocera, Fatal Litigation, FORTUNE, Oct. 16, 1995, a t  60; Jo- 
seph Nocera, Fatal Litigation: Part 11, FORTUNE, Oct. 30, 1995, a t  137. 
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settlement, the antisuit injunction helped to hold the federal 
settlement class action together while alternatives were ex- 
plored. 
c. Ahearn: Buttressing a mandatory class action. The 
third recent global class action in which antisuit injunctions 
have been used is Ahearn v. Fibreboard Gorp.'" Ahearn illus- 
trates a different approach to the prevention of duplicative 
litigation. A settlement as to both present and future claims 
was reached between the defendant Fibreboard and the attor- 
neys representing a class of all persons exposed to Fibreboard's 
asbestos products. As in Georgine, the motion to certify a class 
action was filed simultaneously with the proposed settlement 
agreement. Shortly thereafter, the district court judge, Robert 
M. Parker, provisionally certified the class and issued an ex- 
pansive antisuit injunction."' He enjoined all class members 
from initiating any personal injury claims against Fibreboard 
in any court, "whether by way of commencing litigation, inter- 
vening in existing litigation to which Fibreboard is a party, 
joining Fibreboard in any existing litigation, or in any other 
manner asserting any such claim . . . not pending before the ef- 
fective time of [the] temporary restraining order."l12 
In contrast to the classes in Georgine and the Breast Im- 
plant Litigation, the class in Ahearn was certified as a manda- 
tory class under Rule 23(b)(l)(B) without opt-out rights.'13 
Certification of a mandatory class was ordered because a siz- 
able part of the funds to be paid under the multibillion dollar 
settlement came from insurance companies whose liability was 
uncertain because of pending appeals from a judgment in a 
coverage case against them.ll4 Judge Parker found that there 
was "a significant risk" that Fibreboard would lose on one or 
more issues in the coverage case and that available funds un- 
der Fibreboard's current settlement program would be inade- 
quate to pay all claims.115 Thus he concluded that the case 
110. 1993 WL 767801 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 1993). 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at *2. 
113. In Breast Implant, however, claimants against two defendants who were 
in bankruptcy, Mentor and Bioplasty, were certified as non-opt-out subclasses. In re 
Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 1994 WL 114580 at *3 (N.D. Ala. April 1, 
1994). 
114. Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corporation, 162 F.R.D. 505, 514-17 (E.D. Tex. 
1995). 
115. Id. at 526. 
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was a "limited f u n d  case justifying a mandatory class action 
(which ruling has been appealed to the Fifth Circuit). 
The certification of a mandatory class action is a powerful 
mechanism for preventing duplicative litigation. The appellate 
court in Skywalk found that it has the effect of an injunction 
and therefore must come under an exception to the Anti-Injunc- 
tion Act.ll6 Judge Parker's mandatory class certification was 
buttressed by an antisuit injunction providing class members a 
powerful disincentive, enforceable by contempt, to litigate their 
cases in any fashion outside the class action. The defendant in 
Ahearn was thus assured, as much as is possible in the com- 
plex world of mass torts, of "total peace."'" 
There are costs for such peace-the loss of parties' autono- 
my over their own cases and possible unfairness to individual 
class members due to the "leveling effect" of a settlement. But 
the billion-dollar terms of the three global settlements just 
discussed arguably reflects a much greater willingness by de- 
fendants to make reasonable settlements if they can thereby 
buy peace. For purposes of the narrow issues surrounding man- 
datory class actions and the constraints of the Anti-Injunction 
Act, these global settlement cases reflect a growing willingness 
of courts to squeeze cases into the "limited hnd" and "in aid of 
its jurisdiction" categories to effect a pending settlement. 
Federal courts have been struggling mightily to find a way 
to hold together class-action settlements of mass related cases. 
The tortured course of these rulings contrasts with the sup- 
posed simplicity of the antisuit injunction provision in the ALI 
Proposal. However, some of the problems that have arisen in 
the class-action context might also have to be faced in applying 
the antisuit injunction in the consolidation scheme of the ALI 
Proposal. Conversely, as an analogical development the Propos- 
al might offer insights and examples to class-action courts in 
exploring the appropriate boundaries of the antisuit injunction. 
116. See supra text accompanying note 59; In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos 
Litig., 120 B.R. 648, 655 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("The effect of conditional class 
certification [under Rule 23(b)(l)(B)] will be for all pending state and federal cases 
to become part of the mandatory class and cease to exist as independent cases."). 
117. "[Iln return for the monies to be paid under the Global Settlement, 
Fibreboard and the Insurers would receive 'total peace' with respect to any and all 
claims, direct or indirect, involving the asbestos-related personal injury and death 
claims of the class members." Ahearn, 162 F.R.D. at 517. 
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11. NOTICE OF INTERVENTION A D PRECLUSION 
The second complementary device in the ALI Propos- 
al-notice of intervention and preclusion-invokes quite differ- 
ent procedures and incentives than the antisuit injunction. 
While the antisuit injunction is a threshold device prohibiting 
the pursuit of litigation in other courts, the notice-of-interven- 
tion device focuses on precluding future similar claims by per- 
sons not parties to the aggregated suit. It contemplates poten- 
tially expanding the size of the aggregated suit by identifying 
parties with an interest and notifying them of their right to 
intervene and of the preclusive effect of the suit. 
A. Unsuccessful Attempts to Curb Duplicative Litigation 
with Preclusion 
Preclusion has long been recognized as a possible way to 
reduce duplicative litigation. Over the years there have been 
various challenges to the general rule that persons may not be 
precluded by a judgment if they were not joined as parties. 
These challenges have taken the form of attempts to expand 
the doctrines of "privies," "virtual representation," and other 
exceptions to the general rule.ll8 Even these nonparty preclu- 
sion rules have been criticized as unduly narrow and as failing 
to recognize that there are situations in which individuals 
should be precluded without a right to participate as par- 
ties.llg ARer the 1979 decision in P ~ r k l a n e , ' ~ ~  which reject- 
ed the requirement of "mutuality" in cases of "offensive collat- 
eral estoppel" as to defendants who had a full and fair opportu- 
nity to litigate, some hoped to see an expansion of nonmutual 
pre~lusion. '~~ In mass related cases, however, attempts to 
preclude a common defendant from contesting jury findings 
such as product defectiveness have foundered due to lack of 
identity as to such matters as time, place, and evidence.122 
118. See James R. Pielemeier, Due Process Limitations on the Application of 
Collateral Estoppel Against Nonparties to Prior Litigation, 63 B.U. L. REV. 383, 
387-415 (1983). 
119. See Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the "Day in Court" Ideal and Nonparty 
Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 288 (1992) (concluding that courts should "ask 
whether the absentee has any normative claim to participate a t  all, and, if she 
does, how strong her claim is and what sort of participation opportunities it de- 
mands"). 
120. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 US. 322 (1979). 
121. See generally John C. McCoid, A Single Package for Multiparty Disputes, 
28 STAN. L. REV. 707 (1976). 
122. See, e.g., Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 343-45 (For- 
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Finally, hopes of precluding persons who choose to "sit on the 
fence" and not seek to intervene in a suit in which their inter- 
ests might be affected were dashed by the Martin v. Wi1kslw 
decision prohibiting preclusion without formal party status. In 
response to  Wilks, the ALI Proposal seeks to create a modest 
vehicle for expanded nonparty preclusion. 
B. ALI Proposal for Notice of Intervention and Preclusion 
The ALI Proposal creates a new procedure to notify 
nonparties, who might be affected by the judgment, of their 
right to intervene. The notice provision builds on Justice 
Harlan's comment in Provident Tradesmens that a person who 
fails to intervene in an earlier lawsuit might "be bound by the 
previous decision because, although technically a nonparty, he 
ha[s] purposely bypassed an adequate opportunity to inter- 
~ e n e . " ' ~ ~  As the ALI Proposal notes, some courts flirted with 
a rule of "nonparty preclusion," finding that nonparties who did 
not take the initiative to intervene, despite knowledge that the 
suit would affect their interests, would be precluded by the 
judgment. 12' However, the decision in Wilk~'~~-which held 
that nonparty white fire fighters were not bound by a judgment 
between the department and a plaintiff class of black fire fight- 
ers, and that there is no duty to intervene to avoid preclu- 
sion-rejected such nonparty preclusion. In a footnote, how- 
ever, Wilks left open the possibility of preclusion based on for- 
mal n 0 t i ~ e . l ~ ~  
1. Notice procedure 
The ALI Proposal creates a procedure for notifying 
nonparties that they have a right to intervene, and that they 
will be precluded by the judgment whether they do so or 
not.'" The Proposal also details what the notice should con- 
mer 5th Cir. 1982). But see Fraley v. American Cyanamid Co., 570 F. Supp. 497, 
504 (D. Colo. 1983) (allowing plaintiff who contracted polio from a child who had 
been vaccinated to assert collateral estoppel against the vaccine manufacturer). 
123. 490 U.S. 755 (1989). 
124. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 114 
(1968). 
125. See COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 4, $ 5.05 cmt. a, n.3, at 
280-81 (citing cases). 
126. 490 U.S. 755 (1989). 
127. Id. at 762 n.2. 
128. A somewhat similar approach was taken in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
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tain. Nonparties must be informed of each of the following: the 
nature of the claims to be resolved in the consolidated suit, 
their right to intervene and the time period for doing so, that 
whether they intervene or not they will benefit from the deter- 
minations made and will be precluded from relitigating issues, 
and that they may contest whether the notice standards have 
been satisfied.12' Upon receipt of notice, a nonparty can ob- 
tain a hearing on his claim that the standards have not been 
satisfied and on whether the order should be confirmed, modi- 
fied, or vacated.'" 
The Proposal seems to contemplate only individual notice. 
In so doing, it excludes some important potential uses of the 
preclusion procedure. Individual notice may be feasible in an 
employment discrimination suit of the Wilks variety. In such 
cases, it is usually possible to obtain the names of white fire 
fighters whose rights might be affected by a judgment. But the 
raison d'6tre for the ALI project was to deal with mass related 
litigation such as consumer rights, product liability, and toxic 
torts cases. It is often impossible to identify by name and ad- 
dress all persons whose rights might be affected in such cases. 
Such suits might be better resolved by a class action,l3' but 
even under the Proposal's consolidation scheme, notice of inter- 
vention might in some cases play a useful role in facilitating 
effective resolution through consolidation. 
The question is whether notice might be given to a group 
or organization or to a representative of a definable group of 
persons in such a way as to adequately put members of the 
group on notice of their right to intervene. Put another way, 
42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-2(n)(l). In response to Wilks, that Act amended Title VII of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act to provide that "an employment practice that implements 
and is within the scope of a litigated or consent judgment or order that resolves a 
claim of employment discrimination" may not be challenged, under certain circum- 
stances, by a person who received the specified form of notice and an adequate 
opportunity to object or who was adequately represented. Id. The specified form of 
notice that must be received is: 
(I) actual notice of the proposed judgment or order sufficient to apprise 
such person that such judgment or order might adversely affect the inter- 
ests and legal rights of such person and that an opportunity was avail- 
able to present objections to such judgment or order by a future date 
certain. 
42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-2(n)(l)(B)(i) (Supp. V 1989-1994). 
129. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 4, 5 5.05(b). 
130. Id. 5 5.05(c). 
131. See infia part 1I.C. 
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could a class of nonparty potential intervenors be created which 
would be notified through a named class representative? Per- 
haps this is simply another form of class action that should not 
be confused with the notice-of-intervention device. But since 
the ALI Proposal eschews consideration of class actions, one 
wonders whether a broadened form of group, class, or represen- 
tative notice of intervention should be explored for cases in 
which individuals cannot easily be identified. 
The Comments assert that it is expected that the notice 
"procedure will be used only infiequently or for a small number 
of litigants [as] most parties to complex litigation are likely to 
have filed suit."13' This is a curious statement that sells short 
the notice procedure's potential for preventing relitigation in 
mass related cases. The largest mass related cases are often 
protracted over many years, with suits continually being filed 
over the life of the litigation.'" Even late in the life of mass 
related litigation, there are often a sizable number of unfiled 
claims. The notice-of-intervention procedure need not be limited 
to consolidating or precluding claims that have already been 
filed; the Comments state that the procedure "may be used to 
gather the as yet unasserted claims of nonparties without re- 
gard to whether those claims otherwise would have been filed 
in state or federal court."'34 The Comments, however, also 
say that the procedure is limited to "existing claims and thus 
does not provide a mechanism for addressing the problems of 
duplication or inconsistency that may occur when claims ma- 
ture later that involve the adjudication of some of the identical 
facts."135 
Could the notice-of-intervention device be used for claims 
that have not yet matured? As was discussed in the previous 
section, "futures" claims pose serious problems in aggregated 
cases, and the fairness of resolving them through a representa- 
tive action is being contested on appeal in Georgine and 
Ahearn. Including "futures" claims in an aggregation or preclu- 
sion scheme raises serious questions as to the adequacy of 
notice. Arguably, notice by publication is insufficient to satisfy 
132. COMPLEX LITTGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 4, 9 5.05 cmt. a, at 278. 
133. See Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach for Managing 
Complex Litigation, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 440, 482 (1986); In re Joint E. & S. Dists. 
Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 
1992), and modified on reh'g, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993). 
134. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 4, 9 5.05 cmt. a, at 277. 
135. Id. 
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due process when the potential claimants are unaware of their 
condition. This problem is magnified under the demanding due 
process requirements of Wilks, if notice of intervention is used 
as a basis for preclusion. On the other hand, in some cases, 
notice by publication is likely to result in actual notice. For 
example, persons exposed to a toxic substance may be well 
aware of their exposure, and, through an effective publication 
campaign or common knowledge, may also be aware of the 
dangers incident to that exposure. Breast Implant Litigation 
provides a good illustration; every class member was surely 
aware that she had had an implant, and it is hard to believe 
that, after the extensive media publication campaign, any class 
member could have been unaware of the medical conditions 
allegedly associated with an i m ~ 1 a n t . l ~ ~  In cases such as the 
Breast Implant Litigation, in which class members are aware of 
their potential claims, it might be possible to give as effective 
notice by publication to future claimants as to present claim- 
ants. Thus, if an adequate form of notice of intervention by 
publication could be devised in a proper case consolidated un- 
der the ALI Proposal, the notice procedure might be an effec- 
tive device for dealing with one of the most vexing problems of 
duplicative litigation-"futures" claims. 
2. Rights upon intervening 
Although the Proposal requires notice to potential interve- 
nors, it does not address what rights persons will have if they 
choose to intervene. Will intervenors be accorded full party 
status with its attendant right to be represented by individual 
counsel, to submit separate pleadings and motions, and to 
address the court? If so, one would expect the notice-of- inter- 
vention procedure to be rarely invoked because intervenors 
could quickly complicate a case and make it unmanageable. 
Courts have not, in fact, granted full party status to interve- 
nors. In United States v. Reserve Mining Co.,'" for example, 
the judge ruled that various environmental, civic, business, and 
governmental groups could intervene as of right. However, each 
136. See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant, 1994 WL 578353, at *3 (N.D. Ala. 
Sept. 1, 1994) ("[Ulnlike some latent toxic-tort cases, this notice did not have to 
serve the purpose of informing members of the public about whether they might 
have claims. With rare exceptions, persons would know whether they were breast- 
implant recipients."). 
137. 56 F.R.D. 408, 411 (D. Minn. 1972). 
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side was required to "name a spokesman who will act as their 
representative" and to work in unison to prevent duplication in 
discovery, motions, calling of witnesses, and presentation of 
evidence.138 The attorneys for the original parties were desig- 
nated as liaison counsel, controlling access to the court. In 
Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action,13' the Su- 
preme Court rejected arguments that the district court's grant 
of permissive intervention contained too many restrictions. 
These included prohibiting the intervenors from asserting a 
claim for relief not already raised and from filing motions or 
discovery without first conferring with the parties and obtain- 
ing permission from at least one of them.l4' 
Restrictions of this kind would seem to be essential in the 
mass related cases to which the ALJ Proposal is intended to 
apply. However, at some point restrictions could amount to a 
denial of due process, depriving the intervenor of litigant au- 
tonomy and effective control over the development and presen- 
tation of his case. Significant restrictions are even more trou- 
bling when, as under the &I Proposal, the intervenor has been 
coerced into intervening on threat of being bound by the judg- 
ment, in contrast to the usual intervenor who intervenes on his 
own motion. 
A notice of intervention may not always have the expected 
effect that a person will either intervene or choose not to and 
accept the fact that he will be bound by the judgment. Instead, 
notice may prompt a person to file suit in the forum of his 
choice. Notice of intervention could thus have the unintended 
effect of causing duplicative litigation. To prevent this result, a 
court may have to resort to the other complementary device, 
the antisuit injunction. In fact, it might be prudent for a court 
to issue, simultaneously with notices of intervention, an 
antisuit injunction forbidding all potential intervenors from 
litigating in another forum any claims arising out of the same 
matters. 
138. Id. at 420. 
139. 480 U.S. 370, 377-78 (1987). 
140. Id. 
9251 DUPLICATIVE LITIGATION 955 
C. Developments in the Use of Preclusion in 
Global Class-Action Settlements 
The recent global settlements reveal increasingly sophisti- 
cated use of preclusion doctrines to estop nonparties from filing 
future claims against the settling defendants. The ALI notice of 
intervention and preclusion device has no direct relevance to 
the use of preclusion in these global class-action settlements. 
However, the ALI's recognition of a role for preclusion, accom- 
plished through adequate notice, is consistent with the objec- 
tives of global settlements. 
The three recent global settlements of massive class ac- 
tions discussed in the previous section took different approach- 
es to the use of preclusion. All three were mass tort suits 
against the primary manufacturers of defective products. The 
reality in each was that the settlement might not have been 
achieved if the manufacturers could have been subjected to 
later contribution claims by nonparties found liable to class 
members on future claims arising out of exposure to the 
manufacturers' products. How to resolve this concern became a 
key aspect of achieving the global settlements. 
1. Georgine: Precluding contribution claims of nonparties 
One section of the Georgine settlement agreement prohibits 
all nonparty contribution claims against the settling asbestos 
 manufacturer^.'^^ This provision precludes nonparties, such 
as owners of premises containing asbestos, from seeking contri- 
bution from the defendants if the nonparties are sued by class 
members for injuries resulting from exposure to defendants' 
asbestos. Precluding the contribution rights of nonparties vio- 
lates the principle that one who is not a party cannot be bound 
by a judgment. This is one of the many possible grounds on 
which Georgine might be appealed on the merits.'42 It is pos- 
sible that there will be few contribution cases to raise an effec- 
tive challenge to the preclusion provision because once class 
members have received the benefits of the global settlement, 
they may not be inclined to pursue more questionable claims 
141. Georgine v. Amchem Prods., 157 F.R.D. 246, 282-84 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
142. The case has been appealed interlocutorily to the Third Circuit on limited 
grounds related to claimed error in the granting of the preliminary injunction. See 
Georgine v. Amchem Prods., 1995 WL 422792, at *3 (E.D. Pa. April 1, 1995); see 
also supra note 98, and accompanying text. 
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against third parties. Nevertheless, the purported loss of contri- 
bution rights is no small matter for nonparties. The desire to 
free the settling defendants fkom the risk of contribution suits 
is an understandable goal of the global settlement, but it is 
hard to imagine how it can be upheld under these circumstanc- 
es. 
2. Breast Implant Litigation: A questionable bar order neces- 
sary to effect the settlement 
The global settlement agreement in the Breast Implant 
~ i t i g a t i o n ' ~ ~  also sought to preclude future claims by 
nonparties. The original agreement contained a sweeping "bar 
order" precluding contribution or indemnity claims against the 
settling defendants by nonparties who were sued by class 
members? Such nonparties would include doctors and 
nonsettling manufacturers and suppliers. The agreement would 
also preclude subrogation claims against the defendants by 
nonparties such as insurance companies, hospitals, health 
maintenance organizations, and governmental bodies which 
had made payments to plaintiff class members. Prior to the 
fairness hearing, Judge Pointer invited the nonparties to com- 
ment on or object to the proposed bar order. Several filed objec- 
tions or moved to intervene. 
In his final approval of the global settlement, Judge Point- 
er modified the bar order in relation to nonparties. He noted 
that the agreement "shall not be viewed as precluding such 
non-settling defendants from taking advantage of any rights of 
setoff or credit, or similar rights to limit or reduce claims by 
class members, otherwise available to them . . . under applica- 
ble state laws based on payments made to or for the benefit of 
class members under this ~ettlement."'~~ Thus nonparties 
could claim set-off rights against class members who might sue 
them, but they remained subject to the bar order that preclud- 
ed them from seeking contribution fkom the settling defendants 
in the future. "[Tlhe bar order," Judge Pointer wrote, "is essen- 
tial to the settlement, is fair and equitable, is supported by 
adequate consideration, and is within the court's powers even 
though these other manufacturers, suppliers, and health-care 
143. See supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text. 
144. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 1994 WL 578353, at 
*18 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994) (opinion tentatively approving settlement). 
145. Id. 
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providers have not agreed to the order or been named [as] par- 
ties."146 
Judge Pointer likewise denied the nonparties' motion to 
intervene. He conceded that "having been denied intervention," 
the nonparties could "be entitled to argue against any preclu- 
sive effect under the doctrine set forth in Martin v. Wi lk~ . " '~~  
But he clearly believed the bar order was critical to obtaining 
the defendants' agreement and was willing to leave "the merits 
of [the Wilks] argument" to be "determined . . . by the court in 
which i t  is raised."'" Obviously the bar order might not be 
upheld against the nonparties, but apparently the defendants 
also preferred to defer that question until a later time. 
On a note more positive for the nonparties, Judge Pointer 
did refuse to approve provisions in the agreement precluding 
the subrogation claims of nonparties against the settlement 
fund and class members. The nonparties, he observed, could 
not be deprived of their rights to present their claims or "to 
pursue and perhaps intercept" the "benefits that may become 
payable to individual members of the class."'49 Nonetheless, 
he approved the preclusion of all future subrogation claims 
against the defendants, again favoring total peace for the set- 
tling defendants over nonparty rights. 
3. Ahearn: Accomplishing preclusion through a third-party 
class action 
The global settlement in ~hearn'~' seems to have bene- 
fited from the experience of the prior settlements in Georgine 
and the Breast Implant Litigation. It recognized that to ensure 
certain and effective preclusion of contribution claims, the 
potential claimants should be before the court. The settlement 
accomplished this by providing for a third-party defendant 
class of all persons and entities that might have claims for con- 
tribution and indemnity against the defendant Fibreboard. This 
class included owners of premises containing Fibreboard asbes- 
tos, manufacturers of materials containing Fibreboard asbestos 
as component parts, and others who might be sued in the fu- 
ture by persons exposed to Fibreboard asbestos. A large corpo- 




150. 162 F.R.D. 505 (E.D. Tex. 1995). 
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ration, Owens-Illinois, was named as class representative and 
ultimately, on behalf of the class, it agreed to settle all future 
claims the class might have against Fibreboard. In exchange 
the third-party defendant class received certain benefits and 
concessions. 151 
Use of a third-party class action to preclude future contri- 
bution rights seems a wise choice. Of course, the class repre- 
sentative may not find it in the class's interests to agree to the 
preclusion of contribution rights as the representative did in 
Ahearn. Nonetheless, the third-party procedure is beneficial 
because it empowers the third-party class representative to 
bargain for terrns that would benefit the class members. 
Under the settlement in Ahearn, third-party class 
members' rights under state law to set-offs and credits against 
any asbestos victim who sued them would be preserved. The 
lengthy settlement agreement contained provisions to assure 
that the varying requirements of state laws for set-offs and 
credits would be satisfied. Thus, if a third party were sued by a 
plaintiff class member and found liable, the third party would 
be entitled to set off against the judgment, if the state law so 
provided, any money the class member had received from the 
Fibreboard Trust under the settlement. Similarly, if a plaintiff 
class member obtained a judgment against a third party before 
the plaintiff had obtained payment from the trust, the third 
party would succeed to the plaintiffs' interests against the 
trust. In addition, the agreement contained provisions intended 
to assure that the trust would not be depleted: caps on the 
plaintiff class's attorneys' fees, prohibitions against punitive 
damages and prejudgment interest, and spendthrift provisions 
to keep the trust solvent. Further, the agreement ensured that 
if third-party class members were sued by a plaintiff, they 
would be entitled to obtain discovery free of charge from the 
Fibreboard trust as to any evidence relating to the plaintiffs 
claim against the trust.'" 
At a fairness hearing, Judge Parker found that these provi- 
sions were reasonable and fair to the third-party class and that 
the benefits gained by the class justified precluding its mem- 
bers from filing future suits for contribution against 
151. Id. at 518-20. 
152. These provisions are contained in the Submission of Global Settlement 
Agreement, Trust Distribution Process and Defendant Class Settlement Agreement 
(Dec. 23, 1993), in Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., Civ. Ac. No. 6:93cv526 (E.D. Tex.). 
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Fibreb~ard. '~~ The Ahearn agreement is the kind of arrange- 
ment that other global settlements might look to as a model. It 
goes far in establishing the settlement class action as a suit- 
able device for buying defendants true peace in mass related 
suits without compromising the rights of third parties. 
111. CONCLUSION 
The ALI Proposal's provisions for antisuit injunctions and 
notice of intervention and preclusion are appropriate and nec- 
essary complements to its aggregation scheme. The procedures 
are reasonable, although consideration has not been given to a 
number of problems and potential uses. The Proposal seems 
unlikely to become law soon, but i t  provides a useful example 
of creative applications of devices which might be looked to by 
courts faced with mass duplicative litigation. In the end, the 
application of these and similar devices in the class-action con- 
text seems the most promising way to deal with the problem of 
duplicative litigation. 
153. Ahearn, 162 F.R.D. at 519-20. 
